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Abstract 
 
The role of great powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing 
attention from scholars in recent years. This article examines how Britain rallied international 
opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). As is shown, the British Government 
tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. This 
resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the “TRNC” to be illegal 
and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the 
counter-secession efforts, the article also answers a long-standing question as to whether any 
countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely-held 
view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the 
Cyprus Problem.  
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At one time, the subject of secession and recognition was the unchallenged realm of 
International lawyers.
1
 It was all but ignored by those working politics and international 
relations.
2
 This has now changed. In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in interest in 
how the international community reacts to territories that have unilaterally seceded. Scholars 
are increasingly examining the way in which these territories – otherwise known as de facto 
states, unrecognised states or contested states
3
 – attempt to forge a place in the international 
system,
4
 and the steps that parent states, as the countries that they have broken away from are 
usually known, can take to prevent them from being recognised.
5
 
Within this field, an area that has attracted considerable attention is the role of great 
powers in counter secession efforts. In this context, great powers may be understood as states 
that “wield the most financial, strategic, political and military power” –  a group that includes 
the five permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russia and the 
United States); “economic powerhouses” (Germany, Italy and Japan); and, possibly, non-
declared nuclear powers (Israel, India and Pakistan).
6
 Their influence, particularly that of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council, is incontrovertible. As Coggins notes, 
“Great Power’ recognition decisions are the most important. Their disproportionate material 
capabilities give them substantial influence over other states’ recognition behaviour.”7 Great 
powers are invariably the key to the success, or more usually failure, of an attempt by a 
territory to unilaterally secede. For instance, the only country to have unilaterally seceded and 
become a full member of the United Nations (UN) – Bangladesh in 1972 – did so only after 
securing support from all the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
8
 Great power 
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influence in counter-secession efforts can take two key forms. In the first instance, it can be 
done through bilateral lobbying initiates. Through direct diplomacy, the great power in 
question can attempt to dissuade the target state from recognising the breakaway territory. 
The second key mechanism is through a process of collective non-recognition. This occurs 
when groups of states, acting in concert, agree jointly not to extend recognition to a 
secessionist territory. In the modern international system, the most powerful and effective 
form of collective non-recognition is a UN security Council resolution condemning an act of 
secession.
9
 
This article examines one of the most interesting and enduring cases of secession in 
the modern era. The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), which declared 
independence in 1983, is one of the few cases of de facto statehood that predates the end of 
the Cold War. In this case, Britain was the great power that took the lead in efforts to prevent 
the Turkish Cypriot state from being internationally recognised. Drawing primarily on the 
declassified records from the British National Archives, the article starts by examining the 
emergence of the Republic of Cyprus and its relationship with Britain. It then analyses the 
way in which Britain sought to prevent the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from 
occurring. Finally, it explains how, once the Turkish Cypriots had seceded, Britain sought to 
prevent countries from recognising the TRNC and rallied international support for a UN 
resolution declaring the UDI illegal. 
 
*** 
 
On 1 April 1955, the Greek Cypriots launched an armed uprising to end almost eighty years 
of British Colonial rule and unite the island with Greece (enosis).
10
 Over the next few years, 
the campaign became increasingly violent. This raised the risk of a full scale civil war with 
the island’s Turkish community, which represented about 20 per cent of the population and 
was increasingly demanding that the island be partitioned between Greece and Turkey 
(taksim). Fearing that the violence could lead to direct confrontation, Athens and Ankara 
agreed that Cyprus should become an independent state. A complex power sharing agreement 
was drawn up. At the same time, Britain, Greece and Turkey agreed to guarantee the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the new state. In addition, Greece and 
Turkey were permitted to station military contingents on the island and Britain was granted 
99 square miles of territory in perpetuity – the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) for military use. 
The Republic of Cyprus came into being on 16 August 1960. Despite the tensions that 
existed between the Greek Cypriots and Britain, both sides seemed keen to forge a new 
relationship following independence. Although Cyprus did not join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), it did become a member of the United Nations and, significantly, the 
Commonwealth. However, the internal problems between the Greek and Turkish 
communities continued to simmer. While the Turkish Cypriots were broadly content with the 
power-sharing agreement that gave them an equal say in the management of the state, the 
Greek Cypriots resented the fact that they had been denied the ambition to join with Greece 
and now had to accept that the much smaller Turkish Cypriot community had a fully equal 
status. By 1963, major disagreements existed across a variety of policy areas – such as the 
formation of municipalities, taxation and even the structuring of the armed forces.
11
 In 
response, the Greek Cypriot president of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, proposed a 
series of constitutional amendments. These were rejected by Turkey. In December 1963, 
violent clashes broke out between the two communities. Britain, fearing for the security of 
the Bases, quickly established a joint peacekeeping force – the Joint Truce Force – with the 
Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island. However, this could be no more than 
an interim measure. After trying to look for alternative options, including a NATO-based 
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force, Britain took the matter before the UN Security Council. On 4 March 1964, UN 
Security Council Resolution 186 established the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
and appointed a Mediator to oversee peace talks.
12
 
In the decade that followed, the UN was unable to broker an agreement between the 
two communities. However, apart from a serious outbreak of fighting in 1967, tensions 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots subsided. Far more worrying was the emergence of 
violent divisions within the Greek Cypriot community between the majority that came to 
accept that enosis was no longer a feasible aspiration and a minority determined to maintain 
the struggle for union with Greece. In 1974 these tensions came to a head when Makarios 
ordered the military junta in Athens to remove all the Greek officers commanding the Cyprus 
National Guard. On 15 July, Athens ordered a coup to oust the Archbishop and bring about 
enosis. With British help, Makarios managed to escape from the island. Meanwhile, Turkey, 
under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, sought to enlist Britain’s participation in an 
armed intervention. London refused.
13
 On 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded unilaterally. Within 
days, Turkish troops established a bridgehead on the island, the military junta fell and 
democracy was restored in Greece. This opened the way for a peace conference in Geneva. 
However, this failed after the and Turkey launched a second wave of its invasion. By the time 
a final ceasefire was brokered, Turkish troops had managed to occupy 36 per cent of the 
island.
14
 
Following the division of the island, the United Nations resumed its efforts to reach a 
solution. However, the fundamental parameters of a solution had by now changed. Whereas 
previously, efforts had been focused on providing strong minority rights for the Turkish 
Cypriot community, they now demanded that they have executive powers over their own 
territorial unit. In 1976, the “Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus” (TFSC) was 
established to pave the way for a federal settlement. Reluctantly, the Greek Cypriots accepted 
that any future settlement would be based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. This was 
confirmed by the leaders of the two sides in 1977, just months before the death of Archbishop 
Makarios. In 1979, this arrangement was reconfirmed by the new Greek Cypriot leader (and 
President of the Republic of Cyprus), Spyros Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
Rauf Denktash. In the years that followed, the UN continued its efforts to broker a solution – 
without success – based on these two ‘High Level Agreements’.  
 
*** 
 
In February 1983, rumours emerged that Denktash, who was widely understood to oppose 
reunification,
15
 was preparing the way for a unilateral declaration of independence.
16
 While 
there had long been felt that this had always been his ultimate objective, the Foreign Office 
now prepared a memorandum outlining the steps it could take if it did occur.
17
  First and 
foremost, there was no question of recognising a Turkish Cypriot state. If it did happen, a 
public statement expressing strong disapproval should be made, noting that not only was the 
move contrary to the 1960 treaties, but that it also harmed the ongoing UN talks. At the same 
time, it was recommended that relations with the Turkish Cypriots should be downgraded. 
However, any suggestion that Britain could join the Greece and Greek Cypriots in imposing 
sanctions against the Turkish Cypriots was viewed unfavourably. It was felt that this would 
harm the Turkish Cypriots more that the Denktash “government”.18 
The catalyst for the eventual UDI came on 13 May 1983. Despite the concerns of the 
British Government,
19
 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 37/253.
20
 
Reaffirming the illegitimacy of armed occupations, it stressed the Assembly’s full support for 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and called on all 
members to help the Cypriot Government secure those rights. Denktash was furious. In an 
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interview with The Times, he announced that on his return to the island he would propose the 
declaration of an independent state in Northern Cyprus.
21
 
Despite the general concerns about a possible secession, the initial reaction from 
London was rather relaxed. As noted, Denktash had said such things before.
22
 The British 
High Commission in Nicosia agreed. Although other Turkish Cypriots officials had been 
echoing Denktash’s line, they believed that Turkey would continue to restrain the Turkish 
Cypriots.
23
 The British Embassy in Ankara, while noting that Turkey, which was still under 
military rule following a coup in September 1980, had been “irritated” by the UN resolution, 
also believed that the Turkish authorities would continue to restrain Denktash – even though 
the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ilter Türkmen, had not excluded a possible declaration of 
independence by the Turkish Cypriots.
24
 In reply, the Foreign Office asked the Embassy to 
tell the Turkish Government that a declaration of independence would be contrary to the 
1960 treaties and that they there would be no question of British recognition.
25
 Over in 
Athens, the Greek government was incensed by Denktash’s remarks; although they too 
believed that the Turkish Cypriot leader would not follow through on his threat.
26
 Meanwhile, 
the Cypriot Permanent Representative to the UN submitted a letter to the Secretary-General 
and the Security Council drawing their attention to the “provocative and ominous statements” 
and calling for action.
27
 
Denktash was unbowed. In further comments, he announced that the declaration of 
independence would occur at a “secret” session of the Turkish Cypriot assembly and then be 
confirmed in a referendum.
28
 He also said that he planned to boycott the next round of UN 
discussions. Concern was now mounting that maybe the Turkish Cypriot leader was being 
serious this time. The Turkish Government warned London against believing that Denktash 
could only act with Ankara’s permission. It also suggested that the situation could be eased if 
the next major UN resolution, on the renewal of UNFICYP, which was due just a week or 
two later, was balanced. Britain replied that it had experience of a previous UDI [Rhodesia] 
and that it would not be happy to see a repeat of such a situation.
29
 Meanwhile, the United 
States also began to put pressure on Turkey to restrain the Turkish Cypriots.
30
 
On 3 June, the Turkish Cypriot parliament convened. Although it had been expected 
to discuss independence,
31
 Denktash told representatives that the issue would not be revisited 
until after the UNFICYP debate.
32
 On 15 June, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
534, extending UNFICYP’s mandate. Two days later, the Turkish Cypriot assembly passed a 
resolution. Reaffirming the place of the Turkish Cypriots as the “co-founder partner” of the 
1960 Republic of Cyprus, and condemning the Greek Cypriots for their actions, the document 
nevertheless emphasised that the Turkish Cypriots had created their own political institutions 
and had “the exclusive right of self-determination.”33 Soon afterwards, the British High 
Commissioner in Nicosia, William Wilberforce, met with Denktash. He explained that while 
the British Government “understood and even sympathised” with Turkish Cypriot concerns 
over the UN General Assembly Resolution, a law enabling a referendum would “start a chain 
of events that would be inconsistent with the 1960 treaty arrangements”. Denktash, noting 
that Turkey had said the same to him, claimed that he would do his best to stop any further 
moves towards independence.
34
 A few days later, he called on the Assembly to delay any 
further steps until after he had met with the UN Secretary-General, on 4 July.
35
 But few 
believed that it would produce any positive results. As UN officials saw it, the Turkish 
Cypriots were “no longer interested in serious intercommunal negotiations.”36 
Meanwhile, relations between Britain and the Turkish Cypriots now came under 
strain. Answering a question in the House of Commons, the British prime minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, said that Britain hoped to see “Cyprus continue in a state of unity, as it did nine 
years ago, before it was rudely upset.” Denktash immediately wrote to her to express his 
“disappointment and distress” at the comment.37 He also sent a letter to Baroness Young, 
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Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which he again raised the 
prospect of independence.
38
 Considering this, the Foreign Office continued its contingency 
planning. While recognition was off the table, it still faced a delicate balancing act. While 
Britain’s role as a guarantor required it to be “actively disapproving”, going too far would 
reduce any British influence on the Turkish Cypriots. Several options were raised. These 
included an economic embargo; scaling down or cutting off “unofficial” contacts with 
Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and London; an attempt to cut of European Community (EC) aid 
to the Turkish Cypriots; and a refusal to issue travel documents to Turkish Cypriots.
39
 
Discussions also touched on the practical implications of any UDI, such as tensions between 
Greece and Turkey in NATO; the effects on the UN talks; and the problems Britain would 
face, both in terms of specific bilateral issues as well as regarding Britain’s role as a 
Guarantor Power.
40
 As for timing, attention turned to the forthcoming general elections in 
Turkey, which were due to be held in November. This would see Turkey return to civilian 
rule after three years of military-led government. Already there were concerns that Denktash 
could try to exploit the situation to his advantage.
41
  
As summer came to an end, attention turned to the annual UN General Assembly 
meeting in New York. On 30 September, the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar 
met separately with Foreign Minister Türkmen and President Kyprianou. The next day he 
saw Denktash. Although Kyprianou was “reasonably constructive” about further discussions, 
Türkmen and Denktash rejected de Cuellar’s ideas. Denktash instead wanted a summit 
meeting with Kyprianou. The Greek Cypriot leader was cautious about the proposal.
42
 In 
London, concern was rising about the Turkish Cypriot leader’s intentions. While Britain had 
concluded that the changeover of government in Ankara would not fundamentally affect the 
situation as Turkish policy remained consistent,
43
 it nevertheless believed that Denktash was 
possibly trying to prepare the ground for UDI.
44
 Considering this, London increased its 
pressure on Ankara. Others also joined the effort. However, these interventions appeared 
ineffective. Turkey was not particularly receptive to European pressure. This was due to 
Council of Europe’s decision to bar Turkish MPs from the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
fact that Cyprus was represented in the body.
45
 Even the United States seemed to have 
limited influence. A warning from Washington that a declaration of independence could see 
Congress disrupt the delivery of security assistance went down badly. Ankara merely noted 
that this would have severe repercussions on the United States-Turkish relationship.
46
 
Meanwhile, questions were now starting to be asked as to whether Turkey could even stop 
the Turkish Cypriot leader from pressing ahead with his plans. As a “mid-level” official at 
the Turkish mission in New York explained: 
 
If Denktash failed to get this satisfaction [of equality between the communities in the 
UN talks] he would almost certainly proceed to UDI as (a) there would be nothing to 
lose by so doing; (b) domestic opinion in the TFSC was in favour and Denktash had 
threatened, or hinted at, UDI so often that his credibility might suffer if he failed to 
make good the threat; and (c) after UDI, a new Turkish state of Cyprus, even if 
largely unrecognised buy world opinion, could only be brought to negotiate on a basis 
of “equality” with the Greek Cypriot government. Denktash had already taken 
informal soundings and was counting on support from a handful of countries 
including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia.
47
 
 
Crucially, the report noted that the diplomat believed that the Turkish Cypriots would declare 
independence and that, although a UDI would cause problems for Ankara, Turkey would 
“have to go along” with it. Domestic opinion in the country was increasingly isolationist and 
the General Assembly resolution on Cyprus had been badly received.
48
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All the while, Denktash continued his threats. As he prepared to return to Cyprus, he 
announced that he now intended to rename the TFSC and that the new state would quickly be 
recognised by 10 to 15 countries and become a full member of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC).
49
 Worryingly, back on the island, a Turkish Cypriot MP tabled an 
amended referendum bill that would allow the executive to make a proclamation of 
independence without a popular vote, “should communal, national and international 
conditions dictate and should there be harm in further delay.”50 
London now began to consider the wider repercussions of a UDI.
51
 It was especially 
worried about the Socialist PASOK government in Greece, led by Andreas Papandreou. 
Viewed as an “extreme government”, the concern was that Greece that could withdraw the 
country from NATO.
52
 It was at this point that the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir 
Peregrine Rhodes, first raised the possibility that, if a declaration of independence did occur, 
Britain should take the lead at the United Nations. As he explained, “This would show 
recognition of our special responsibilities in Cyprus and would…help to pre-empt the sort of 
resolution for which we could not vote. A British veto to protect Turkey should be avoided at 
all costs…The proposed statement by HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] should surely be 
strengthened by a reference to the action taken by Denktash as contrary to international law 
and to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.”53 Additionally, efforts were made to try to ensure that 
the Greek Cypriots would take a calm approach. As London noted, “if Denktash declared 
UDI he (Kyprianou) will in effect have lost the game. Although the Turks would come in for 
a great deal of international opprobrium for letting Denktash slip, Kyprianou should be under 
no illusion that they would give up. He would be faced with a partitioned Cyprus for the 
indefinite future.”54 Kyprianou appeared to appreciate the danger he faced. Speaking to the 
press, on 12 October, he noted that his administration was making every effort to avert a 
Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence.
55
 Significantly, Ankara was also trying to talk 
up the UN process and calm fears about an imminent Turkish Cypriot UDI. In an interview 
with Milliyet, a leading Turkish newspaper, Türkmen noted that the Turkish Cypriot leader’s 
latest comments had not been what Ankara had “expected”.56 London saw Türkmen’s 
comments as a “slap on the wrists” for Denktash, but also recognised that while Turkey was 
evidently aware of the wider consequences of a UDI – especially the fact that it would 
receive little, if any, international support – they had little room for manoeuvre: 
 
They are keenly aware that while UDI might have psychological appeal for the 
Turkish Cypriots (and many Turks) and would only be recognition of a de facto 
independent government already in existence there probably are far more 
disadvantages than advantages if UDI is declared. Turkey would have to continue 
(and even increase) financial aid, few countries would recognize the new state and 
superpowers would ensure that it did not gain admission to the UN… However, as we 
have previously reported, there are limits to how much pressure the Turks can out on 
Denktash as any indication Turkish authorities are not firmly in support of Turkish 
brothers in Cyprus would be politically unthinkable.
57
 
 
Arriving back in Cyprus from New York, Denktash made it clear that he had taken no notice 
of the rebuke from Türkmen. He told waiting crowds that the time had come to give the 
TFSC a name the world understood: The North Cyprus Republic. However, he also 
acknowledged, he might have to wait until he could persuade Ankara that further talks with 
the Greek Cypriots were pointless.
58
 Still, Britain continued its efforts to try to prevent a 
declaration of independence. As well as expediting further UN talks,
59
 the possibility of some 
form of letter to President Kenan Evren, or to the new Turkish Prime Minister after the 
elections, was raised.
60
 The British Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, who was in Turkey 
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for a visit at the time also raised London’s worries about developments.61 Although the US 
was rather more “sanguine about the prospects for UDI that London at this stage”,62 Britain 
also stepped up its efforts to encourage other EU and NATO members to put pressure in 
Turkey.
63
 Most were receptive to the idea. France, however, demurred on the grounds of its 
poor relations with Ankara and because it did believe that a UDI was imminent.
64
 More 
helpfully, the NATO Secretary-General, Joseph Luns said he would speak to the Turkish 
Permanent Representative. This was viewed as a “useful development” given his “good-
standing” with the Turks. Indeed, it was even suggested that he might use his “good offices 
further on this matter”;65 although it was later decided that it would probably be better if he 
kept his engagement informal.
66
  
As well as trying to head off UDI, London continued to think ahead to possible 
options should it happen. There were a range of considerations that needed to be taken into 
account, including the need to be seen to fulfil international obligations; the desirability of 
maintaining good relations with Cyprus and Greece; limitation of damage (in Cyprus, in 
NATO and so far as possible, to Turkey’s relationship with the West).67 The British 
Permanent Representative at the UN in New York, Sir John Thomson, emphasised that it 
would be to Britain’s advantage if it immediately called for consultations and the adoption of 
a resolution. The greater the delay, the more Russia and “others” would have to make 
“mischief”. In a particularly revealing comment, it was also noted that Britain could, 
“presumably gain good marks with the Greek side for reacting promptly.” Having said this, it 
was also argued that consultations with the Greek Cypriots should be avoided as they might 
ask for “unwelcome” elements to be introduced into the resolution, such as sanctions. To this 
extent, the view was to move quickly and then explain the content of the resolution to the 
Greek Cypriots to get “at least their tacit approval for the resolution so that we were not 
stymied by them in the Council before the resolution came to a vote.”68  
All the while, Britain kept up the pressure on Denktash. Visiting Cyprus, Baroness 
Young crossed the Green Line to meet with the Turkish Cypriot leader. Over the course of a 
long lunch, she repeated London’s concerns over UDI and noted that it would be viewed by 
many countries as a dangerous precedent. Acknowledging that he was under pressure from 
Turkey and other Western states, Denktash shied away from committing himself to UDI. 
Britain therefore concluded that the threat was now receding.
69
 The United States agreed.
70
  
Although there may have been a sense in London and Washington that the Turkish 
Cypriot leader had been dissuaded from declaring independence, one major challenge still lay 
ahead. As British diplomats noted, the general elections in Turkey presented Denktash with 
an ideal opportunity to put his plan into action as Ankara would not be able to respond to a 
Turkish Cypriot initiative.
71
 Clearly the Turkish Government was also worried about this too. 
Speaking on television the night before the election, Türkmen stated that while no one denied 
the Turkish Cypriot community’s right of self-determination, Turkey still believed that the 
best solution to the Cyprus issue was not the division of the island, but a federal solution – 
and was constantly advising the Turkish Cypriots as much.
72
 
On 6 November, Turkey went to the polls to elect a new civilian government. Despite 
all the fears, there was no UDI. By way of explanation, Denktash told the press that it had 
now been put on hold due to the decision of Kyprianou to accept a high-level meeting.
73
 
Despite this, the Turkish media continued to report that Denktash had not shelved his plans. 
Rather, he would now use the period leading up until the formation of a government in 
Turkey to declare independence. This would be ideal as a declaration at that time not 
embarrass the outgoing government nor the incoming one.
74
 On 10 November, the Turkish 
Cypriot Assembly held a special meeting to discuss a draft law on extraordinary situations 
that gave the Turkish Cypriot administration, on the recommendation of the commander of 
the security forces, a two-month period to take a range of special measures, including 
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imposing curfews and control publications. While this was seen by some as evidence that 
something was potentially afoot, on balance the British High Commissioner still felt that a 
declaration of independence was “improbable”. As he saw it, this was more about Denktash 
putting pressure on the Greek Cypriots.
75
 In a report prepared on 14 November 1983, the 
British Embassy in Ankara also stated that it felt that a UDI was not imminent. Yet again, the 
United States concurred. As Washington saw it, Denktash was trying to “alarm the Greek 
Cypriots”.76 He would not want to upset his relations with the new Turkish prime minister, 
Turgut Özal. Nor would President Evren want UDI while his attention was focused on the 
creation of a new Turkish government. Instead, the view was that Denktash would now wait 
to see how his meeting with Kyprianou went. The French, Germans and Italians were broadly 
in agreement as well.
77
 
At 8am (6am GMT) on 15 November 1983 the Turkish Cypriot Assembly passed a 
resolution “approving the establishment of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the 
Declaration of Independence”.78 The timing took everyone by surprise, including the Turkish 
Government.
79
 In Nicosia, High Commissioner Wilberforce and the US Ambassador, 
Raymond Ewing, immediately agreed that the first step should be for the Foreign Office and 
State Department to express their “surprise and displeasure at the Turkish Cypriot move” to 
the Turkish Government.
80
 In London, the Foreign Office swung into action. Ministers 
quickly approved the contingency plan that had been put together in the event of UDI.
81
 
Speaking with Kyprianou by phone, Thatcher insisted that Britain would not recognise the 
Turkish Cypriot state.
82
 Soon afterwards, the Foreign Office issued a statement deploring the 
purported declaration of independence and stressing that the British Government only 
recognised one Cypriots state under the Government of President Kyprianou. It also 
announced that it was calling for consultations with the Greek and Turkish governments 
under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee and that it would be in touch with “other 
interested governments including EC and NATO partners.”83 Addressing the House of 
Commons that afternoon, the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, reiterated that there was no 
question of recognising “more than one Government for Cyprus”,84 and that Britain was 
approaching the President of the Security Council “with a view to securing an early 
meeting”.85 The British mission at the UN was also instructed to circulate the draft resolution 
that had been prepared to the Greeks and Cypriots, as well as the Americans, French, Dutch 
and other relevant parties.
86
 
Other Western states quickly lined up to condemn the Turkish Cypriot decision as 
well. The State Department issued an initial statement expressing “surprise and dismay” at 
the Turkish Cypriot move; with a stronger one to follow.
87
 Likewise, France, Australia, 
Germany and Italy, amongst others, also condemned the move.
88
 The Greek Government, 
then holding the rotating presidency of the European Community, circulated a draft text for 
consideration by the ten members,
89
 noting that if no comments were received by 10am the 
following morning it would be issued as a joint statement.
90
 Needless to say, hopes for a joint 
statement by NATO were prevented by Turkey.
91
 However, some other countries, such as 
Norway, also noted their concerns about any actions that “might exacerbate inter-allied 
relations”.92 As the day progresses, condemnations emerged from around the world. Sonny 
Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, wrote to Thatcher to say that he was sure 
that all Commonwealth Governments would immediately wish to denounce the purported 
declaration of independence and express their solidarity with the Republic of Cyprus.
93
 And 
yet, while much of the West and many Commonwealth members quickly voiced their support 
for the territorial integrity of Cyprus, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europeans were 
conspicuously quiet. This did not go unnoticed by Greece, which summoned the relevant 
ambassadors to the Foreign Ministry.
94
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The key question at this stage was how Turkey would respond. Word had emerged 
that the Turkish National Security Council would convene that afternoon and that the 
president, prime minister and foreign minister would all attend.
95
 At this stage, Britain 
wanted to avoid antagonising Ankara. For example, Howe deliberately avoided blaming the 
Turkish Government for the situation. Instead, he placed responsibility firmly at Denktash’s 
feet.
96
 He also instructed the British Embassy in Ankara to approach the highest Turkish 
officials and tell them that Britain hoped that they would not associate themselves with the 
Turkish Cypriot decision. However, they were proving to be elusive. A request by the British 
Ambassador, Sir Mark Russell, for a meeting with President Evren was rebuffed as being 
against protocol.
97
 The prime minister and foreign minister also refused to see the 
ambassador. Eventually, Russell had to make do with the Undersecretary at the Foreign 
Ministry, Ercüment Yavuzalp, who again insisted that the Turkish government had been 
surprised by the move.
98
 He also noted that, as Türkmen had explained to the Greek 
ambassador a little earlier, Turkey had made efforts to stop Denktash, but could not control 
him.
99
 
At 3pm, Foreign Minister Türkmen emerged from the National Security Council 
meeting to read out a statement. After noting that the Turkish Government had only been 
informed of the Turkish Cypriot decision that morning, and that it had previously made its 
views known to Denktash, he announced that the Turkish Government “had decided to 
recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”100 Despite this, London still hoped that 
the Turkish Cypriots could be persuaded to rescind the declaration. A little later that day, the 
British ambassador in Ankara finally saw Türkmen, who began by insisting that the Turkish 
Government and the Turkish Cypriots were still committed to UN talks. After noting that 
Britain had consistently emphasised its opposition to any attempted UDI to Turkish officials 
over the previous months, the ambassador forwarded a request by Thatcher to the Turkish 
president asking that he assist in securing a reversal of the declaration. Türkmen said that he 
would forward the message, but noted that, “there is no reverse gear in this car.”101 
Britain now pressed ahead with efforts to convene the UN Security Council. At this 
stage, it was unclear when it could be held. The Cypriot foreign minister, George Iacovou, 
was due to arrive in New York the next day, but Denktash would not be there until the day 
after.
102
 This led to differences of opinion within the Council – comprised at the time of 
China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, 
USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire, Zimbabwe. The USSR and Nicaragua pressed 
for a meeting before the Turkish Cypriot leader arrived. The US, supported by Pakistan and 
Jordan, felt that the meeting should take place when Denktash could also be heard.
103
 In the 
meantime, informal consultations indicated that the British draft resolution had been 
generally received favourably.
104
 The US welcomed the draft resolution and saw no difficulty 
in supporting it.
105
 The same went for the Dutch.
106
 The Soviet Union said that the Council 
should wait to hear from the parties before taking a position.
107
 Even though “different bits” 
of the resolution were disliked by the Athens and Ankara,
108
 the Turkish permanent 
representation at the UN seemed relieved that Turkey was not directly condemned in the 
text.
109
 
While efforts continued in New York, concerns grew that other countries could follow 
Turkey’s lead and recognise the TRNC. Attention was focused on Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Malaysia.
110
 London and Washington immediately began an 
intensive effort to stop them from doing so.
111
 Despite this, on 16 November news emerged 
that Bangladesh had decided to recognise the Turkish Cypriot state. During a meeting with 
the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, the British High Commissioner in Dhaka was told that 
Bangladesh had indeed “taken the decision in principle” to recognise the Turkish Cypriot 
state. As the Minister explained, “Bangladesh’s centuries old links with Turkey meant that 
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they had a natural sympathy with the Turkish case.”112 However, it was unclear whether this 
meant that Bangladesh had already recognised the TRNC, or was merely planning to do so. 
While the Turkish Foreign Ministry believed it had,
113
 the United States charge d’affaires in 
Dkaka said that he had been told by the foreign minister that while Bangladesh had informed 
Pakistan and Turkey that it recognised the TRNC, it was now “backing off” until it had had 
the chance to discuss the issue with other Muslim states, including Indonesia and Malaysia.
114
 
Meanwhile, Pakistan also appeared to be on the verge of recognition. Its ambassador in 
Ankara told the Ambassador Russell that although he had yet to receive instructions, 
President Zia had promised to recognise a Turkish Cypriot state during his recent trip to 
Turkey.
115
 In contrast, Iraq indicate that it would go along with the majority view of the Non-
Aligned Movement. It would not recognise the TRNC, even though this could complicate its 
relations with Turkey.
116
  
Following discussions, the Security Council decided to meet on 17 November. 
Worryingly for Britain, the prospect of a damaging split within the Council had emerged.
117
 
Arriving in New York, Iacovou expressed his concern about the speed with which Britain had 
moved in the Council and announced that the Greek Cypriots would be preparing their own 
draft resolution. As far as Nicosia was concerned, the resolution should simply have 
restricted itself to the UDI and calling on states not to recognise it. It should not have 
suggested that UN talks continue as before. Nicosia was also unhappy with the reference to 
the two communities. The emphasis should be on the Republic of Cyprus, which was not 
mentioned in the draft. That said, Iacovou hoped that the two drafts could be combined. 
Defending Britain’s actions, Ambassador Thomson said that he felt that Britain might not 
have moved fast enough given reports that Bangladesh had already recognised and that other 
might follow. He also noted that the British government had received more surprise and 
criticism from the Turks.
118
 Meanwhile, Iacovou met with several representatives of the Non-
Aligned Contact Group on Cyprus, including Algeria, Mali, India, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, 
Cuba and Guyana. Ominously, this was the group that had initiated the UN General 
Assembly resolution earlier in the year that had caused such a strong reaction from Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots.
119
  
Over the course of the day, discussions on the draft resolution also continued. As one 
official noted, “predictably, it is too weak for the Cypriots and too strong for the Turks.”120 
Although Britain sought to balance the wishes of the two sides, there was absolutely no doubt 
where its priorities lay: “Given the need to maintain good relations with the Greeks and 
Cyprus and our vital interest in the Sovereign Base Areas we must adhere to our position of 
deploring the Turkish Cypriot declaration and regretting Turkey’s recognition of it.” 
Nevertheless, London also recognised the need to “avoid unnecessarily (and probably to no 
good effect) antagonising the Turks in a way which would cause long-term deterioration in 
our relations”.121 Therefore, while Britain was determined to refer to the ongoing UN 
process, to placate the Greek Cypriots it was willing to replace “deplored” with the stronger 
“condemned” and make explicit reference to the Republic of Cyprus.122 Also, reference could 
be made to Cyprus’ non-aligned status. As for the Turks, it was suggested that references 
could be made to the breach of the 1960 treaties.
123
 This would be read as an indirect 
criticism of the Greek Cypriots. Overall, though, it was already felt that Turkey would not 
pose a major problem in the process. Despite its earlier bravado, Ankara now appeared to 
want to minimise “international hostility”; especially from United States, which could yet 
withhold military aid. Crucially, in line with Britain’s wishes, the Turkish Government 
seemed keen to encourage the renewed Cyprus negotiations.
124
 
At the same time as negotiations continued over a draft a resolution in New York, 
Britain also continued its efforts to prevent any further recognitions. The focus of attention 
was on the two Security Council members that appeared to be wavering. Pakistan was a 
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source of concern as Islamabad had said that the matter was under “urgent consideration”.125 
In contrast, Jordan appeared to be moving in a different direction. The Foreign Ministry said 
it thought that it was unlikely that there would be any early move to recognise the Turkish 
Cypriot state as it wished to co-ordinate its position with other Islamic countries.
126
 More 
generally, the threat of further immediate recognitions appeared to be receding. Ever 
increasing numbers of countries were now condemning the Turkish Cypriot UDI.
127
 By far 
the most important of these was the Soviet Union. After initially prevaricating, it now issued 
a strong statement in which it shared the “profound concern” now being “expressed 
everywhere”. Noting that the Turkish Cypriot action was directly aimed at partitioning the 
island, and should be repealed, it too stressed the need to resume the UN intercommunal talks 
“as soon as possible”.128 Although this certainly strengthened the British position on the 
matter, the Greek Cypriots held firm. Meeting with Thatcher in London, Kyprianou argued 
that while it was important to pass the resolution quickly, he remained concerned about a call 
for the resumption of negotiations.
129
 
On 17 November, two days after the UDI, the Security Council met to discuss the 
situation. There were three speakers in the morning session: the UN Secretary-General and 
the foreign ministers of Cyprus and Greece.
130
 Once again, de Cuellar insisted that he 
intended to continue his mission of good offices. Taking the floor, Iacovou said that the 
Turkish Cypriot declaration was null and void. Criticising both the Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey, which so obviously supported the Turkish Cypriots, he insisted that the UDI was a 
direct result of Turkey’s use of force in 1974 and that any decision to recognise the Turkish 
Cypriot act would be a breach of UN principle. The Greek foreign minister, Ioannis 
Charalambopoulos, followed the same line. Condemning the Turkish Cypriot UDI as a 
“criminal act”, he called Denktash “Turkey’s puppet”. He also launched a broadside against 
Greece’s NATO allies, insisting that, “Turkey’s policy in Cyprus was only possible because 
of its military power, as those who supplied Turkey with military equipment should 
remember.” In the afternoon, eight speakers addressed the Council: Denktash and the 
representative of Turkey, Nicaragua, India, Seychelles, Australia, Algeria and Canada. 
Emphasising that he had not come to say sorry for his actions, the Turkish Cypriot leader did 
apologise for taking the step as the Secretary-General was intensifying his efforts to find a 
solution. However, as he saw it, the Greek Cypriots were not serious about the moves.
131
 The 
Turkish representative said that Turkey had asked the Turkish Cypriots to wait, but had to 
respect their decision. He reiterated that the move “was faithful to the High Level 
Agreements” and that Turkey had no territorial designs for Cyprus. As the floor was opened 
to others, all the rest of the speakers, to a greater of lesser degree, condemned the Turkish 
Cypriot move. 
Meanwhile, Britain and Cyprus had been working on a text “all day”.132 It was not 
easy. The Greek Cypriots had consistently pushed for a stronger text. Moreover, it was now 
being reported that two other – “extreme” – drafts were now being circulated.133 In one, 
circulated by Guyana, the sole aim was to condemn the Turkish Cypriots. If this passed, it 
would remove all Turkish influence over Denktash. Also, any insistence on withdrawing the 
UDI prior to further negotiations would play into Denktash’s hands as it would allow him to 
stop any further talks. Turkey therefore made it known that, “at worst”, it could accept the 
British text.
134
 To win over the Greek Cypriots, London offered references to the Republic of 
Cyprus and its non-aligned status. While both were accepted, Iacovou countered with a raft 
of other changes that he claimed had been agreed by Thatcher and Kyprianou. These included 
replacing “deplores” with “condemns”, and deleting several operative paragraphs; such as 
paragraph 5, which “calls upon the parties to fully co-operate with the Secretary-General in 
his mission of good offices”, and paragraph 8, which “calls upon all States and the two 
communities in Cyprus to refrain from action that might exacerbate the situation” – a 
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phrasing that Nicosia saw as giving equality between the Cyprus government and the Turkish 
Cypriots. The British representative explained that these changes would “bust the 
negotiations”.135 After further consultations, it was agreed that operational paragraph 2 would 
state that the Turkish Cypriot declaration was legally invalid. Iacovou was then told there 
would be no further concessions.
136
  
As expected, Denktash was livid at the text and threatened to call off any further 
intercommunal talks if the resolution was passed.
137
 At an informal Security Council meeting 
held later that evening, Pakistan attempted to introduce a series of amendments that favoured 
the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions. However, these were defeated when Guyana, 
Nicaragua and Zimbabwe announced that if discussions were reopened they would introduce 
pro-Cyprus amendments. The text was now finalised. In a telegram to London, British 
officials noted that, “barring last minute hitches the Council should vote on the text tomorrow 
morning (18 November) with at least 13 votes in favour.”138 
The next morning, Türkmen met with Howe at the Foreign Office. Once again, he 
insisted that Turkey could not control Denktash and that it had been against the UDI. He also 
reiterated that once the declaration had been made Ankara had no choice but to accept it. 
Looking ahead, there was no chance that the UDI would be reversed. The key task now was 
to resume UN talks. As for the draft resolution, he raised several objections. He opposed the 
reference to only one administration in Cyprus, noting that it had been agreed in 1975 in 
Geneva that there were “two administrations” in Cyprus. He also rejected the “very strong 
addition” of a statement that the declaration of independence was legally invalid. As he saw 
it, the international community now had to accept that a new state existed and that if 
Denktash was pushed into a corner, he would not negotiate. He was also very critical of the 
position London had taken. As he noted, while Turkey had expected Britain’s reaction to the 
UDI to be unfavourable, it had been “surprised by its vehemence.”139 Howe agreed that the 
British response had been strong, but he argued that this had been “right and necessary” 
given the pressures it faced in the UN. The Turkish government, in opposing UDI before it 
took place, had surely recognised that the Turkish Cypriot move would necessarily be a 
change for the worse. As Howe explained, the results had been entirely foreseeable: 
 
We had earlier made it very clear that we were firmly opposed to a declaration of 
independence. We deplored Denktash’s action. It would not contribute to a solution. 
We regretted that Turkey had recognised and were disappointed that out 
representations had not been heeded. Denktash’s actions and its timing were a severe 
setback to the Secretary General’s initiative. The Turks could hardly have been 
surprised by our resolution. It represented our view and the view of the majority of 
the UN members.
140
 
 
By this point, the danger of further recognitions had all but disappeared. Although there were 
reports that Indonesia was considering it,
141
 Bangladesh had by now told the Commonwealth 
Secretary-General that it had not recognised the TRNC and that it would not do so until after 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which was due to be held in India the 
following week.
142
 Pakistan was also holding off. A statement put out by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs expressed sympathy for the Turkish Cypriot people and regret at the lack of 
progress in the intercommunal talks, but made no mention of recognition.
143
 
At 4.30pm on 18 November 1983, three days after the unilateral declaration of 
independence, the Security convened for its 2500
th
 meeting. Despite the agreement that had 
been reached the night before, prior to the meeting the Greek Cypriots attempted to introduce 
a set of new amendments. These included changing the word “authorities” to “leadership” 
and omitting operative paragraph 8, which called “on all states and the two communities in 
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Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation”.144 The British 
resisted. The text that had been accepted was tabled. UN Security Council Resolution 541 
received 13 votes in favour. Pakistan voted against it. Jordan abstained. Crucially, the 
Council not only deplored the purported declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities, it considered it to be legally invalid and called on states not to recognise any 
Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Summing up the responses to the resolution 
in a telegram back to London, the British permanent representation noted that the “Greek 
Cypriot and Greek reaction is one of euphoria tinged with regret that the resolution had not 
tilted further in their direction. The Turkish Cypriot and Turkish reaction is one of 
rejection.
”145
 
 
*** 
 
While the international community has a deep-seated aversion to acts of secession, great 
powers have an important role to play in marshalling international opposition to specific 
attempts by territories to break away. As noted, this can be done through bilateral lobbying 
and through broader multilateral diplomatic initiatives. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot 
unilateral declaration of independence, throughout the whole period leading up to the UDI, 
and in the period afterwards, Britain was quite clearly the most closely involved of all the 
permanent members of the Security Council. The United States certainly took a very close 
interest in the situation, and worked alongside Britain to try to prevent the UDI, and then to 
rally opposition to the move. However, Washington saw London as the lead actor in the 
process. France also voiced its opposition to the attempted secession, but did little to try to 
tackle the situation directly, largely because of its exceedingly poor relations with Turkey at 
the time. The Soviet Union was particularly slow to act, but when it did it came down firmly 
against the Turkish Cypriot decision. Interestingly, China appears not to have featured in the 
discussions at all, even though it did vote in favour of Resolution 541. 
From the very start, London consistently tried to prevent any UDI. It stressed to 
Turkey and to Denktash that under no circumstances would Britain recognise such a move 
and attempted to exert leverage over the Turkish Cypriot leader. However, from the record, 
Denktash was very much his own man. Contrary to widespread perceptions, he knew that he 
exerted as much control, if not more, over Turkey as Turkey exerted over him. He also 
proved to be a consummate game player, constantly keeping everyone wondering whether 
and when he would take the plunge and declare independence. While London continually 
wavered as to whether he would in fact go through with an attempt to secede, from the first 
moment it became a distinct possibility Britain drew up contingency plans to address an 
eventual secession. Moreover, as soon as the UDI occurred, London began a concerted effort 
to lobby countries not to recognise the purported secession. Reaching out to its allies and 
partners in the EC, NATO and the Commonwealth, there can be no question as to Britain’s 
commitment to stopping the Turkish Cypriot UDI from succeeding. While there is a good 
case to say that a UN Security Council resolution would have passed without Britain’s 
concerted efforts – as noted, it was all but certain the US and the Soviet Union would have 
blocked its membership of the UN, the so-called “gold standard” of universal international 
recognition
146
 – there was a distinct possibility that several other states would have 
recognised the TRNC before this occurred. As states are often reluctant to reverse 
recognitions once they have taken place, it is certainly possible that the TRNC would have 
more recognitions today had it not been for the quick and concerted effort by Britain to stop 
them.  
This in turn raises another very interesting, and rather obscure, question concerning 
the 1983 declaration of independence that has confused observers for many years: did any 
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country apart from Turkey ever recognise the TRNC? It had long been suggested that either 
Bangladesh or Pakistan did. Reviewing the documents, it is certain that Pakistan did not. It 
certainly may have wanted to do so. It may even have intended to do so. However, it did not 
do so. Bangladesh is a rather more interesting, and confusing, case. It appears the government 
did take the decision to recognise the TRNC. Moreover, it then communicated this decision 
to Turkey. However, there is no evidence to suggest that it communicated the fact directly to 
the Turkish Cypriot authorities, which would be expected, or made a public statement to 
confirm that it had recognised the TRNC. Perhaps the clearest indication of what happened 
came from a conversation between the Pakistan and British ambassadors in Dhaka: 
 
Pakistan ambassador tells me that at 0835 local (0235) GMT on 17 November 
Bangladesh Foreign Minister telephoned him in order to inform him that Bangladesh 
had recognised Turkish Cypriot Government with effect from 0800, and asked him to 
report as much to his government – later Doha expressed his irritation that Pakistan 
had not followed suit, and admitted that Bangladesh had wished to be the first to do 
so, in confident expectation that others would follow. Ambassador told him that if he 
had checked beforehand, he would have been told that this was unlikely.
147
 
 
On balance, therefore, it seems that Bangladesh did in fact recognise the TRNC, but quickly 
regretted the decision and so decided to pretend that it had not. 
Finally, the events of 1983 raise a very important point about the relationship between 
Britain and the Republic of Cyprus – or, more specifically, the Greek Cypriots. There is a 
common tendency for many Greek Cypriots to regard Britain as sympathetic to Turkey and 
the Turkish Cypriots, and that it has always looked out for their interests. Equally, they 
believe that Britain is somehow implacable hostile to the Greek Cypriots. As the events of 
1983 showed, this is not the case. From the outset, London was aware that it had to play a 
delicate balancing act. While it recognised the need to take immediate action in the event of 
UDI, and stress that such a move was contrary to international law and the 1960 treaties 
underpinning the Republic of Cyprus, it did not want to wholly alienate Turkey or the 
Turkish Cypriots, such as by imposing economic sanctions. That said, it is clear from the 
documents that, when faced with a choice, Britain’s key interest lay with trying to keep the 
Greek Cypriots satisfied. As seen, although there may have been some differences between 
London and Nicosia in terms of the final resolution put before the Security Council, Britain 
consistently and persistently warned the Turkish Cypriots against a unilateral declaration of 
independence, and then, once it had happened, took the lead in rallying international 
opposition to the attempted secession. This was warmly welcomed by the Cypriot 
Government.
148
 Britain’s central role in defending the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Cyprus in the face of the Turkish Cypriot UDI deserves to be more widely recognised and 
acknowledged. 
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